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ABSTRACT 
This article makes the case for the adoption of a 
Basic Income in the UK, set at the level of £8,500 per 
adult and £4,250 per child. In contrast to advocates 
of more limited measures such as a ‘partial basic 
income’, we argue that a relatively generous Basic 
Income is affordable in the UK and can be paid for 
via a comprehensive reform of the tax and benefits 
system. We particularly identify the potential for 
wealth taxes as addressing any funding shortfall. 
Moreover, advocates of a limited Basic Income fail 
to address the fundamental problem of the current 
system, which is not its unequal nature with limited 
benefits per se, but its propensity for extreme 
precarity at short notice. As such, the current Covid-
19 pandemic has brutally exposed the shortcomings 
of a flexible labour market combined with a limited 
welfare safety net in the UK. We argue this increases 
the urgency and appeal of a comprehensive Basic 
Income. 
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Introduction 
This article argues that the Covid-19 pandemic has dramatically furthered the case for a Basic 
Income in the UK and increased its urgency. It is argued that the abrogation of the state of its 
welfare responsibilities and the cultivation of the growth of precarious jobs under the auspices of 
the gig economy has combined to create a perfect storm in the context of a global viral pandemic, 
which has left many brutally exposed, with over 40,000 deaths in the UK (at the time of writing). In 
the sections that follow two key deficiencies of the dominant economic model in the UK, in the face 
of the current crisis, are explored before our Basic Income proposition is put forward. 
In this context, arguments for a Basic Income have taken shape in recent years over about how 
worker incomes would be derived from a reduced input to automated production and services 
processes amidst the increasing capture of physical, intellectual and financial capital by a small elite. 
This has led to calls (e.g., Standing, 2017) for the implementation of a universal basic income (UBI), 
in order to provide economic security. Discussion of a  Basic Income have accelerated with the 
growth of forms of work associated with the gig economy (De Ruyter and Brown, 2019). However, 
the concept of a Basic Income is hardly new – it has been discussed in academic circles for many 
years (De Wispelaere and Stirton, 2004). Indeed, some consider the genesis of the Basic Income 
concept to lie as far back as the publication of St. Thomas More’s Utopia in 1516 (More, 2010).  
To date, the construct of a Basic Income has generated considerable criticism (see Reed and Lansley, 
2016; for a discussion). Some commentators suggest that a universal basic income is a blunt 
distributive mechanism, in that rich individuals would also receive it in addition to poor persons, and 
hence it makes no allowances for wealth. Similarly, a flat-rate Basic Income would make no 
allowances for additional circumstances, such as having dependents (e.g., children). Others simply 
suggest that the “public” would not welcome the notion of people being paid, irrespective of 
whether they chose to work (ibid). Rubery (2018) argues that a Basic Income could have deleterious 
effects on women’s labour market participation, as it could further entrench their status as care 
providers if formerly unpaid domestic work were to come under its auspices. However, pilot studies, 
including the recent Finnish pilot study (Kangas et al., 2019) suggest that for poorer recipients a 
basic or minimum income has significant and positive effects on wellbeing across a range of 
indicators even in states with a strong social safety net.  
Experience with the 2008-09 global financial crisis and its aftermath suggests caution in interpreting 
the current Covid-19 induced crisis as somehow necessitating that the current drastic measures will 
lead to a more fundamental overhaul. Even now, state intervention to support individuals and 
businesses is only being seen in many quarters as due to “exceptional circumstances”. However, the 
impact of Covid-19 as a vast ‘exogenous shock’ to the world economy has exposed the fundamental 
fragility (or indeed, crisis) in the global capitalist model, with its predilection for smooth (global) 
supply chains and labour market corollary of workers on-demand in the ‘gig economy’. As such, this 
has given renewed emphasis of the appeal of a Basic Income.  
Moreover, Covid-19 entails the prospect of a more lasting contraction in the capitalist economic 
model in the absence of a vaccine, by simple dint of the fact that many ‘proximate’ services1 could 
face a long-term attrition of employment as these sectors struggle to emerge from national 
                                                          
1 i.e., those services that cannot easily be conducted with any modicum of physical distancing (e.g., passenger 
aviation and personal services such as hairdressing). 
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lockdowns. Hence, Covid-19 could engender a structural hit to the economy that entails hysteresis, 
with a long-lasting impact on the make-up of the labour force. The highly probable prospect of 
millions of displaced service-sector workers for the foreseeable future gives further credence to the 
need for a Basic Income to cushion the negative impacts of such disruption. 
Amongst others, the Spanish Government is set to implement a UBI (Orihuela, 2020), whilst Nicola 
Sturgeon, the First Minister of Scotland, has also expressed interest in establishing a UBI2, with 
serious work being undertaken to establish a series of pilot studies in four local authorities in 
Scotland (Danson, 2019). Hence, in the following sections, we look at two key phenomenon in the 
UK that have combined to escalate the severity of the current pandemic crisis; hollowing out of the 
provision of public services by the state; and growth of precarious work, before making the case 
(and costings) for a comprehensive Basic Income in the UK. 
Hollowing out of the state 
The past decade has seen a reduction of the role of the state in the UK in maintaining societal 
welfare. This has been typified by the “austerity” policies in introduced by a Conservative 
government since 2010, purportedly in response to the Global Financial Crisis of 2008-09. Whilst 
overall state expenditure rose dramatically as a share of GDP during the 2008-9 crisis, the decade 
since has seen this return to its pre-crisis levels (Eurostat, 2020a). What such figures hide, however, 
is the changing nature of such spending on different demographic groups in the UK. In particular, 
spending on the elderly has jumped, with “old age” social protection (largely made up of spending 
on the state pension) jumping from 7.1% of GDP in 2007 to 8.3% a decade later (Eurostat, 2020a).  
Whilst most fiscal transfers (often loosely termed “benefits”) for those of working age have been 
frozen (and so have, in real terms, fallen), the state pension has been increased more quickly than 
both inflation and average earnings (Thurley and Keen, 2017). Spending on disability support has had 
to increase, largely to support an increasingly elderly and frail population. As such, spending on 
family benefits (with child benefits being limited to 2 children per family), income support, tax 
credits and Universal Credit (combined)3 has fallen, from 2.8% of GDP to 2.3% of GDP prior to the 
Covid-19 outbreak (Eurostat, 2020a). The burden of these cuts has fallen disproportionately upon 
women and BAME individuals4, adding a strongly gendered dimension to the impact of the cuts 
(Pearson, 2019). WBG5 research predicted that the poorest families would suffer a 17% drop in living 
standards by 2020, whilst single mothers (92% of sole parents) would incur an 18% drop in living 
standards over the same period (ibid.), and this was before the advent of Covid-19. In the current 
context, these groups are especially vulnerable. 
Similar stories abound across other government departments: police spending has fallen from 1.3% 
to 1% of GDP, the law courts, prisons and fire service have all seen cuts whilst the budget allocated 
to community amenities has fallen from 1.2% to 0.8% of GDP. Communities characterised by 
multiple indices of deprivation have been hardest hit by these cuts (Financial Times, 2013; Gray and 
Barford, 2018; Hastings, Bailey, Bramley, & Gannon, 2017), with the culling of the previous Labour 
Government’s Sure Start programme of children’s centres for (poor) parents with young children 
                                                          
2 https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/universal-basic-income-ubi-scotland-uk-nicola-
sturgeon-coronavirus-a9498076.html  
3 These benefits are spread across two COFOG (Classification Of the Functions Of Government) groups – 10.4 
and 10.7, relating to “Family and Children” and “Social exclusion n.e.c.” respectively. 
4 BAME individuals as such are particularly vulnerable to Covid-19, in being prone in terms of overcrowded 
housing, low-paid insecure work and lack of access to green space etc. (Khan, 2020). 
5 Women’s Budget Group 
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being particularly damaging (Torjesen, 2016). The education budget, which many would argue 
represents an investment in the future productive capacity of the country, has fallen from 5.7% to 
4.8% of GDP. 
Moreover, it is not as if this occurred at a time of rapid economic growth. Far from it – GDP per 
capita did not surpass its 2007 level until 2015 (Office for National Statistics, 2019b). As a result, 
these changes resulted in substantial real-terms cutbacks across the UK. This “death by a thousand 
cuts” has been mirrored in employment trends. At a time when the population has grown, the 
number of serving full-time equivalent (FTE) police officers fell by almost 14% in England and Wales 
between 2007 and 2018 (Home Office, 2019b). The same trend is visible in the fire service, where 
the number of FTE active firefighters fell by almost 24% in England alone (Home Office, 2019a). Such 
numbers are mirrored across the public sector, leading to the public sector falling from 19% of total 
employment in 2007 to 16.2% a decade later (Office for National Statistics, 2020b), when measured 
on a consistent basis6. 
Whilst health spending has ostensibly been “protected” in real terms, this is rather less impressive 
than it looks. Due to the ageing of the UK’s population, the past decade has seen a rapid rise in the 
proportion of the population who are elderly or have ‘underlying health conditions’: precisely the 
groups most at risk from Covid-19.  
The growth of the precariat 
The second argument underpinning the case for a Basic Income in the UK relates to the increasing 
precariousness of the labour market. Analysis by John Philpott for the Resolution Foundation 
reported that some 22.2% of the workforce in 2016 (up from 18.1% in 2006) were in highly 
precarious forms of work (Booth, 2016). Of these, a breakdown of this 22.2% suggests that 15.1% 
were “self-employed”, 4.3% on a temporary contract, and 2.9% on “zero hours” contracts (which 
only comprised 0.5% of the workforce in 2006). Of the self-employed, Philpott’s analysis suggested 
that 2 million were earning less than £8 per hour. These are the people that we often associated 
with the “gig economy”(De Ruyter and Brown, 2019).  
However, the precariousness of the UK labour market goes further than this, with a substantial body 
of “permanent” employed workers subject to a high degree of job insecurity simply by not having 
been in their current job for long enough to be covered by unfair dismissal provisions. The qualifying 
threshold is two years’ continuous service in their current job, which was extended from one year by 
the UK Government in 2012 7 – i.e., the UK Government has deliberately extended the number of 
workers excluded from employment protection provisions. Hence, two key facets of precariousness 
are pertinent; that of insecurity of tenure and lack of employment protection thereof; and that of 
the resultant income insecurity (particularly for those with dependents under 16). Focussing on 
these starkly illuminates the degree of precarity in the UK, as depicted in Table 1.  
Table 1: Incidence of precarious forms of employment in the UK, 2019 (Oct-Dec) 
Employment type Number  Those with dependents (under 19) 
Dependent contractor** 737,844 245,432 
Job that is “not permanent in some 
way” * 
1,437,217 522, 194 
                                                          
6 Several reclassifications due to bank nationalisations and subsequent partial re-privatisation, alongside 
privatisation of Royal Mail mean that the series needs to be adjusted to be consistent. The consistent series 
excludes these. 
7 https://archive.acas.org.uk/index.aspx?articleid=3733  
4 
 
Employees with current employer for 
less than 2 years (continuous service) 
7,946,729 3,320,052 
Current employees who were “out of 
employment” in previous 12 months 
1,528,955 670,445 
Zero-hours contract 701,990 274,227 
Source: (Office for National Statistics, 2020c), Labour Force Survey (Oct-Dec) 
*This is a catch-all category for temporary work, including agency work, fixed-term contracts and casual work. 
** Data on dependent contractors taken from April-June 2019, as these figures are not collected in the Oct-
Dec survey. 
There is some overlap between these categories, generating a pool of individuals whose 
employment status is precarious along several different vectors. Of those whose job is not 
permanent in some sense, 222,241 were on zero-hours contracts. A total of 2,654,810 individuals 
faced significant uncertainty over their future income in the sense of being either on a zero-hours 
contract or a dependent contractor or having a job that is non-permanent in some other sense. 
Nearly 8 million employees were excluded from unfair dismissal provision because they had not 
attained two years’ continuous service in their current job. Of these 564,250 were single parents 
(ibid). Additionally, lack of coverage of adequate sick pay for millions of workers in the UK is a 
significant form of market failure, as there is no incentive to stay home when ill, if one consequently 
does not receive an income, exacerbating the impact of a pandemic. 
However, further labour market reforms remain on the agenda for the Conservative Party; Dominic 
Raab, currently Foreign Secretary in the UK, claimed in 2012 that “People who are coasting – it 
should be easier to let them go, to give the unemployed a chance. It is a delicate balancing act, but it 
should be decided in favour of the latter.”8 Raab of course, along with four Tory colleagues, including 
current Home Secretary, Priti Patel; and International Trade Secretary, Liz Truss, were the authors of 
‘Britannia Unchained — Global Lessons for Growth and Prosperity’,9 which purported to be a 
manifesto to ostensibly strip back protective regulations and seek to mimic Singapore in its techno-
market orientation.  
Alongside an eagerness to erode the conditions of employment is a parsimonious attitude to the 
unemployed. This was captured in a statement from the architect of Universal Credit, former Work 
and Pensions Secretary, Iain Duncan Smith, who quipped in 2012 of benefit allowances that he could 
“live” on £53 a week10. In a similar fashion, the right-wing media have been ardent exponents of 
demonising benefit recipients as having an “easy life”.11 Eagerness to attack the unemployed does 
not bear up to scrutiny when assessing the impoverishing level of support provided on Universal 
Credit (£95.40 per week for a single person over 25) and the severe sanctions regime in enforcing 
job search (Pearson, 2019)12.  
However, Covid-19 has brutally exposed the fundamental flaw in constructing a labour market 
dependent on a large group of relatively low-paid individuals with little recourse to statutory labour 
rights, or a decent welfare safety net to fall back on. In this context, a large section of the workforce 
who might not have had any empathy with the unemployed have now found themselves having to 
                                                          
8 https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2012/aug/22/britannia-unchained-rise-of-new-tory-right  
9 https://www.palgrave.com/gp/book/9781137032232  
10 https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2013/apr/01/iain-duncan-smith-live-benefits?CMP=twt_gu 
11 https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2605677/Mother-two-never-worked-encouraged-daughter-
pregnant-council-house-easy-life-benefits.html  
12 For example, the requirement for parents of 3 to 4 year old children - even lone parents - to be available for 
work (ibid. 32). 
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apply for Universal Credit (over 1.5 million new applicants as at May 2020). That these new-found 
claimants have been shocked at the actual nature of the benefits regime, rather than what they 
were led to believe (Bentley, 2020), could lead to a rethink of attitudes towards the unemployed. 
Hence, Covid-19 has shown up deficiency of the welfare system in the UK not in terms of its 
inequality per se, but rather in terms of arbitrarily imposing severe precarity on the livelihoods of 
millions of families at little notice.  
As such, one of the challenges facing any social protection system is how to deal with earners with 
uncertain or volatile earnings. This is rendered particularly acute with the gig economy. Universal 
Credit, for example, starts to taper at an income of zero (£3,500 if one has dependent children) and 
is very aggressive – one loses 63% of additional net income13. It’s designed to be cheap and is 
necessarily compromised in order to be so. Indeed, this causes practical problems that plague 
Universal Credit: individuals with volatile incomes or who are paid at non-standard intervals. If one 
happens to earn a lot in one month then this will be clawed back out of future payments: the system 
doesn’t operate in real-time. As a result, the system fails to ameliorate precariousness amongst the 
most vulnerable in society. As such, in the next section, the case is made for a comprehensive Basic 
Income. 
A Basic Income for the UK 
As noted earlier, there are typically two objections levied against a Basic Income. In our view these 
are inextricably bound together. Firstly, its opponents typically object to the notion of getting 
“something for nothing” – in this view it is unethical for individuals to receive an income without 
working for it – and secondly it is derided as unaffordable.  
However, our collective application of the principle is decidedly patchy. We take steps to protect 
pensioners from destitution even when they have spent a significant portion of their lives out of 
work. Moreover, we do not engage in confiscatory taxation of inheritance. It’s difficult to argue that 
people “deserve” a significant inheritance – it comes like manna from heaven. The argument that 
this is private property is of dubious validity: it could be used by the state to reduce the taxes paid by 
others. In any event, it is difficult to make the argument that all of those with a low (or zero) income 
deserve their fate. Almost all developed countries have some form of social protection system, in 
order to provide a safety net for the vulnerable and unlucky. For most of us there is also a more 
selfish motive: witnessing significant hunger, homelessness and destitution is a deeply distressing 
experience. 
The second; that of ‘affordability’ is a rather more pressing challenge. Modern social protection 
schemes are only ‘affordable’ because they impose extraordinarily high tax rates on the first few 
thousand pounds of income. Universal Credit claimants never pay less than 63% and effective 
marginal tax rates are often as high as 75%. It is unsurprising that such high marginal tax rates offer a 
significant disincentive to working and can imply a marginal net wage as low as £2.18 per hour. 
When the rewards of work are meagre, there must be significant penalties associated with not 
working. The inevitable result is a vast, costly and bureaucratic system of ‘command and control’ to 
enforce work. This system of enforcement has led to significant holes in the social safety net – see 
e.g. BBC News (2020) - reinforcing precariousness. It is fundamentally unjust that the poor should 
face the highest marginal tax rates. 
                                                          
13 https://www.gov.uk/universal-credit/how-your-earnings-affect-your-payments 
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A Basic Income removes the conditionality associated with traditional benefit schemes and can 
dramatically reduce the effective marginal tax rate of the poor. However, it is also likely to 
unambiguously worsen the work incentives faced by a significant proportion of taxpayers (Van Parijs 
and Vanderborght, 2017). It is this that lies at the core of the “trilemma” identified by Martinelli 
(2019). There is no easy way to avoid this, although we would stress that the current system is 
simply another compromise. Thus, at the heart of the ‘affordability’ conundrum lies an unpalatable 
truth – affordability is a choice. 
The absence of a ‘perfect’ system should not blind us to the reality that some are notably better 
than others. The present pandemic has demonstrated the fundamental weakness associated with 
conditional social protection systems. Since a partial basic income risks manifestly failing to deliver 
(Martinelli, 2019), we therefore argue that a full basic income is the only viable capitalist solution to 
precariousness, for which the present pandemic has served to amply demonstrate this. 
An affordable Basic Income in practice 
The challenge of affordability is twofold. Firstly, we wish to minimise the rate of tax levied on labour 
income in order to reduce adverse behavioural responses. Secondly, we pay careful attention to the 
framing of affordability. For a Basic Income to be practical it must be done in a politically acceptable 
manner. Finally, we acknowledge practical limitations and suggest a phased introduction of a Basic 
Income for all. Since pensioners already receive something akin to a Basic Income via a combination 
of the state pension or pension credit top-ups, a large number of pensioners are already in receipt of 
something akin to a Basic Income. The generosity of this system is a significant contributory factor to 
recent falls in pensioner poverty, in spite of a stagnant economy (Francis-Devine, 2020).  
Our central scenario envisages a Basic Income of £8,500 per adult and £4,250 per child (the rationale 
for this is detailed in Appendix 1). The gross cost of our scheme is some £388bn and so is slightly 
more expensive than some of the schemes discussed in the literature (e.g. Martinelli, 2019)14, 
although it is also considerably more generous than most of them. However, one of the major 
benefits of a Basic Income is the elimination of means-tested benefits. Additionally, we propose a 
“clawback” starting at zero additional earnings at 16.8%. The rationale behind this is as follows: a 
Basic Income necessarily entails a change in the tax schedule, moving the high effective marginal tax 
rate away from low earners towards higher ones. However, “tax rises” to fund a Basic Income are 
likely to be unpopular, particularly given the (ill-founded) criticism that the scheme also benefits 
high earners. 
Imposing a “clawback” neuters both political objections at once, without changing the substance of 
the scheme. A clawback is mathematically identical to imposing a higher marginal tax rate on a 
certain range of income. The difference is in the political messaging. This is akin to the similarity 
between a basic income and a negative income tax, in spite of the philosophical issues raised by 
some (Tondani, 2009). The net effect of these two measures is to reduce the cost of a UBI to less 
than £192bn.15 Naturally this poses challenges to affordability, although it should be noted that the 
                                                          
14 Lansley and Reed (2019), for example, proposed a partial basic income of £60 a week to adults (18-64). In 
addition, mothers would get £40 a week extra per child and adults 65+ would receive £175. This would be 
funded by tax increases of £28 billion. The authors also proposed a more ambitious UBI funded out of a 
‘Citizens Wealth Fund’ (ibid.) and hence not requiring tax rises, but this would be phased in and hence 
constitute a distinctly longer-term measure. 
15 A proportion of the 5m self-employed would also end up with a clawback. Our scheme is designed so that 
everything is clawed back by £50,000 (approximately 90% of wage earners earn below this amount). 
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present system is ‘affordable’ only because it imposes very high effective marginal tax rates on low-
income earners and, as mentioned previously, involves a rather punitive sanctions regime. 
As such, we propose funding a Basic Income by using a combination of tax measures, as calculated 
and detailed in Appendix 1. In total we estimate that the measures detailed would generate 
approximately £253.9bn of additional revenue. In total, therefore, we estimate the following 
additional tax incomes: 
 £113-123bn in additional income taxes 
 £12bn in additional Corporation Tax 
 £41bn in additional consumption taxes (VAT) 
 £50-100bn in new property taxes (net value, after eliminating Council Tax and Stamp Duty 
Land Tax) 
 Some £45-50bn from a financial transactions tax 
It is our view that a comprehensive Basic Income as that articulated here is pivotal, indeed essential 
in order to address the precariousness experienced by a growing number of workers, but moreover 
that it is affordable, and politically expedient. In the penultimate section, wider issues pertaining to 
the introduction of a Basic Income and related welfare issues in the context of the current pandemic, 
are considered. 
Implications for the State and Society:  
The material presented in previous sections illustrates that a comprehensive Basic Income in the UK 
can be affordable and address poverty. To reiterate the central premise, the Covid-19 pandemic has 
demonstrated in stark fashion the precariousness of existence faced by much of the workforce, and 
the inadequacy of the benefits system, with its stringent means-testing, delays in vital payments and 
punitive sanctions regime. Far from being a “great leveller” the SARS-Cov2 virus has exacerbated the 
inequalities present in the UK: women, BAME individuals, and otherwise low-paid and insecure of 
tenure have all suffered disproportionately. To reiterate, with an estimated death toll of over 40,000 
at the time of writing, the pandemic has brutally exposed the shortcomings of UK Government 
labour market and welfare policy over the past ten years.  
This failure is all the more aptly borne out when one considers the trends in life expectancy in the UK 
over the past decade (before the current pandemic). What is distinctly noticeable in the UK is that 
the increase has slowed to virtually zero. Indeed, one notices a sharp decline coterminous with the 
change of Government in 2010. As such, it is reasonable to say is that the welfare outcomes 
manifest in the UK do represent the outcome of deliberate political choices. This should be sobering 
food for thought for anyone concerned with the cumulative impacts of cuts to spending on public 
services and other amenities designed to preserve the social fabric of a country, as ‘talk’ of “how to 
pay” for the crisis gathers pace (Hearne, 2020). Tentatively, it can reasonably be argued that Covid-
19 will exacerbate the negative trend here still further.  
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Source: Office for National Statistics (2018) 
However, there is another contrast worth noting, and that is the comparison between the UK in 
terms of life expectancy trends, and other comparable developed countries. The UK is significant in 
that life expectancy across advanced economies has generally continued to rise. It is in this context 
that the case for a Basic Income has renewed appeal. 
 
Selected European states, including all EU members with a population over 3 million. Emphasis on 
UK. Data sourced from Eurostat (2020b) 
 
Conclusion  
This article has outlined how a Basic Income can be affordable at a generous level for the UK. We 
argued that the essential precarity of the UK labour market and failings of the welfare system in the 
current Covid-19 pandemic have served to reiterate the importance of a Basic Income. Whilst a Basic 
Income on its own cannot guarantee decent health outcomes, in remedying the precarity of the 
labour market it would serve to provide a modicum of security (and hence wellbeing) for individuals 
and families alike. Moreover, once established as a key element of the welfare system, its levels 
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could be readily adjusted to cope with contingencies of the sort that Covid-19 has generated (e.g., by 
supplementary cash grants or revising claw-back thresholds). Ultimately, the degree of precarity and 
inequality that a society faces is one of choice. As the UK struggles to cope with the pandemic and 
calls to “re-open the economy” gather pace, it remains to be seen whether Basic Income will 
become an accepted part of the political landscape. 
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Appendix 1 – Costing a UBI 
Our central scenario envisages a Basic Income of £8500 per adult and £4250 per child. The rationale 
is as follows. The existing Universal Credit system pays £409.89 per month to a single adult over the 
age of 25, plus their local housing allowance. The latter varies by area and is linked to market rents. 
For a mid-cost part of the country, this implies a total payment of just under £8500 (as a reference, 
the payment to a single individual aged 30 in Birmingham would be £8402.68) to an individual. 
It can be argued that individuals living in high-cost regions (notably, but not exclusively, London) and 
those aged over 35 who live in single-person households are worse off under our proposed system. 
However, we would suggest that this is only the case in a very limited sense and arises primarily out 
of the inequity of existing provisions. Living in a costly area with high quality amenities is a choice, 
not a necessity. It is profoundly unjust that those living in poor areas should receive less than their 
counterparts living in a more salubrious areas16. An additional side-effect of the present system is 
that it inflates rents in high-cost areas, with a substantial portion of the payment potentially going to 
landlords. 
Our payments for children are moderately more generous than Universal Credit and Child Benefit 
combined, with scope to increase this further. Having children is closely correlated with most 
measures of poverty (Barr, 2012). Currently, almost 20% of working age adults with dependent 
children are in receipt of means-tested state benefits (Office for National Statistics, 2020c), 
compared to below 8% of working-age adults without dependent children. Increasing payments for 
children is an effective way to reduce poverty and carries a lower cost compared with paying a basic 
income to adults. 
The gross cost of our scheme is some £388bn. However, one of the major benefits of a basic income 
is the elimination of means-tested benefits. We propose retaining existing additional payments to 
disabled individuals, since these are designed to compensate for the higher cost of living they 
experience as a result of their disability. At present, not counting disability benefits (a total of 
£46.3bn), the UK Government spends approximately £72.3bn on various income contingent benefits 
(HM Treasury, 2019). These include £48.2bn on income support, tax credits, family benefits and 
Universal Credit and a further £22.5bn on housing benefit in addition to £1.7bn on unemployment 
(Ibid.) Eliminating these means that the net cost falls to some £316bn. 
This is somewhat more expensive than some of the schemes discussed in the literature (e.g. 
Martinelli, 2019), although it is also considerably more generous than most of them. Naturally, this 
poses challenges to affordability, although we note that the present system is affordable only 
because it imposes very high effective marginal tax rates on low-income earners and involves a 
rather punitive sanctions regime (Pearson, 2019; Van Parijs and Vanderborght, 2017). We propose 
funding the basic income using a combination of tax measures. 
Taxes on Income and Consumption 
Caution should be urged at this juncture: the behavioural consequences of tax rises are highly 
uncertain, although the HMRC figures we use do attempt to estimate this. Eliminating the personal 
allowance is estimated to raise between £78bn and £85bn, whilst doing the same for National 
Insurance raises a further £27bn (Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs, 2020c). We propose 
                                                          
16 In any event, a single-person household under the age of 25 living in a relatively high-cost area (North West 
London) would have been entitled to under £9000 per annum under the pre-Covid-19 payment levels, which is 
close to our proposed figure. Couples living outside of London will be unambiguously better off under our 
proposed system, with virtually all couples being better off compared to the pre-Covid19 payment rates. 
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increasing the higher rate of income tax by a further 8p and the additional rate by 3p, raising a 
further £8bn-£11bn (ibid). As such, a total of between £113bn and £123bn are raised from various 
income taxes. 
A further £12bn can be raised by a 5 percentage point increase in the rate of corporation tax (ibid). It 
should be noted that this would still leave corporation tax lower than its 2010 level. Finally, a 5 
percentage point increase in VAT (which ultimately functions as a consumption tax) and elimination 
of the reduced rate raises a further £41bn. Whilst VAT is often derided as a regressive tax, it has 
merit as it captures spending by those who might avoid income taxes17. Moreover, our other 
measures are highly progressive. We propose increasing capital gains taxes to a level equal with 
income tax. The revenue raised from this move is trivial, but it is both equitable and reduces the 
ability of individuals to avoid tax by substituting income for capital gains. 
Taxes on Wealth 
Wealth in the UK is taxed much more lightly than earned income (REF). Whilst much of this is to 
avoid double-taxation (if earnings pay for the acquisition of an asset then taxing the value of that 
asset is not optimal), this is far from true in every case. This is particularly egregious in the case of 
housing. Within the UK, property wealth is both unevenly held and undertaxed relative to other 
assets. The UK’s stock of housing wealth (note that this is net of mortgage debt) is worth 
approximately £5trn (Office for National Statistics, 2019a) and is highly unevenly spread with a gini 
coefficient of 0.66. The cost of a relatively generous UBI is therefore in the region of 5% of total net 
housing wealth. 
Property Wealth 
At present in the UK, the taxes levied on property are rather archaic, being a combination of an 
annual levy to partially fund local government – “council tax” - and a portion of the value of the 
property at the time of sale – “stamp duty land tax”. Council tax is based on the property’s “rateable 
value” in 1991 and raises some £30bn (Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs, 2020b), whilst stamp 
duty land tax raises approximately £12bn (Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs, 2020a). Neither are 
sensible or optimal tax policies and council tax in particular is quite regressive. Since its ostensible 
purpose is to pay for local services (being one of the few taxes that is payable to local government) it 
is payable by renters and homeowners. Again, a series of exemptions and reductions exists based on 
often arbitrary criteria. There is a strong argument for a complete overhaul of local taxation in the 
UK, but such a discussion is beyond the scope of this paper. 
An ideal solution would be a land value tax. This would retain optimal incentives (the supply of land 
is fixed, and as you’re taxing the value of land and not the value of any structures built upon it there 
remain strong incentives to improve properties) and could theoretically allow us to substantially 
reduce taxation of incomes. However, there are practical challenges in its implementation and such 
a tax would be politically unpopular (although perhaps no less unpopular than some of our proposed 
tax changes). Various figures have been mooted for how much such a tax might raise, although most 
estimates are substantial (e.g., Barnaby and Pierce, 2017). 
Estimates of the average value of residential land in each Local (District) Authority in England were 
produced by the Ministry of Housing Communities & Local Government (2018). By combining this 
with the land area of each Local Authority and information on land-use by District we can estimate 
the total value of residential land in England. According to these data, this is approximately £4trn, 
                                                          
17 The adage income tax “taxes some of the people all of the time” whilst VAT “taxes all of the people some of 
the time” is apposite here. 
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which fits relatively well with the estimated £6trn of gross housing wealth in Great Britain. Given the 
preponderance of housing wealth concentrated in London (around 40% of all residential land value 
is in this region), the inclusion of Scotland and Wales is likely to have only a very modest impact on 
the overall value of residential land in Great Britain. 
If we assume that England’s proportion of Great Britain’s total residential land value is equal to its 
proportion of total residential property value (just under 91%) then the total value of residential 
land in Great Britain is £4.46trn. This seems a reasonable approximation. Such a tax has the rare 
advantage of being simultaneously economically efficient and also progressive. Whilst there are 
likely to be administrative challenges, many of these represent one-off disputes and should not 
prove insurmountable (Mirrlees et al., 2011). 
Aside from this, two practical challenges present themselves alongside one more conceptual 
difficulty. Firstly, as the tax is linked to an asset rather than a flow of income, many individuals who 
are “asset rich but cash poor” might struggle to pay it. The solution to this is to give the option to 
defer payment to the time of sale. The second is that a substantial volume of residential property is 
held by either councils or housing associations as “social housing”, for the benefit of poorer 
residents. In theory, a sufficiently generous basic income should obviate the need for this. For most 
of the country, our basic income does achieve this objective. In the small number of areas where this 
is not the case (mostly London), a phased elimination of subsidies should be adopted. We reiterate 
the argument that it is neither efficient nor equitable to subsidise those who choose to live in 
expensive districts. 
The conceptual challenge is to decide at what rate land value should be taxed. For much of the 
country, a rate as high as 5% of total land value should be affordable (being little more than Council 
Tax, which this tax would replace, in most mid-cost areas). However, this is rather higher than most 
estimates of long-term real interest rates. If we assume a lifespan of 125 years for an average 
residential property, the Treasury Green Book envisages a long-term discount rate of some 2.5%. For 
most of the country this would be a much lighter tax than Council Tax is (we estimate the average 
property in Birmingham would pay around £910, for example), although some high-cost areas would 
be taxed much more heavily. 
Such a rate would raise around £110bn per annum. Even if such a tax replaced Council Tax, it would 
still raise a net £80bn per annum. Of course, a lower rate (for exceptionally long-lived projects the 
Green Book suggests a long-term discount rate of 1%, which is arguably appropriate in the case of 
land) would deliver a lower tax take. For reference, 1% would deliver just £14bn once the 
elimination of Council Tax is considered and would have a net additional tax take of close to zero if 
Stamp Duty were also abolished. The net new tax take therefore varies between £2bn and £70bn 
depending on the rate that is set. A rate of 1.5% would deliver around £45bn per annum. 
Such a tax would be highly progressive: property owners in Hartlepool would pay just £386 per 
annum on average – far lower than their current Council Tax bills. Meanwhile, those in salubrious 
Cambridge (who, let us remember, are wealthy by dint of their ownership of a very substantial asset) 
would pay on average around £2552 per annum – in the region of double current Council Tax bills. 
Only those in the very wealthiest locales would pay substantial amounts, with freeholders in 
Kensington & Chelsea subject to a tax of £12,600 per annum on average18. 
                                                          
18 The estimates for London boroughs are represent a somewhat fictional situation, being the amount payable 
for the freehold of an individual flat. In practice, the freehold is typically held for a block of flats. Again, in 
practice the amount raised would be lower due to the presence of social housing. Since the basic income will 
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In line with Mirrlees, et al. (2011), we also suggest taxing rents – including imputed rents – as a 
consumption good (implying that VAT should be levied). However, it is desirable that we ensure that 
we are taxing the consumption services of the dwelling and not duplicating taxation of land. This is 
surprisingly difficult to do since at least some of the value of rents are to pay for the implicit value of 
nearby amenities, which are captured with a land value tax (areas with good schools and green 
spaces typically attract higher rents than areas with poor schools and concrete facades). 
Total imputed rent in the UK in 2018 was approximately £176bn (Office for National Statistics, 
2020a) suggesting that VAT of 25% could raise £36bn from this source19. In theory, a further £14bn 
can be raised from VAT on actual rents at this rate. However, given the above discussion over land 
values, a better solution might be to levy VAT at a reduced rate and a slightly higher land value tax. 
Even a 12.5% VAT would raise around £28bn. Of course, imputed rents are also a form of income for 
households, in much the same way that dividend income from shares is and theoretically could also 
be liable to income tax. However, we are of the view that a Land Value Tax is a better instrument 
since in theory all of the rents due to the land itself can be taxed away (leaving just a string of 
payments for a consumer durable, on which VAT would be levied as it would on a car or washing 
machine). In total, therefore, we estimate that property taxation can raise anywhere between £52bn 
and £100bn per annum. 
A financial transactions (Tobin) tax 
Although long-mooted and very widely discussed in the economics literature, there has hitherto 
been only limited practical interest in a financial transactions tax. There are certainly risks to such a 
form of taxation, potentially disadvantaging the City relative to other financial centres or 
encouraging firms to domicile elsewhere. Nevertheless, whilst there is huge uncertainty over 
whether it would succeed both in its original stated purpose (in terms of reducing market volatility) 
and as a revenue raising device. 
A wide synthesis of the available evidence commissioned by the Department for International 
Development concluded that such a tax would be feasible and had the potential to raise significant 
revenues (McCulloch and Pacillo, 2011). Using their central estimates, a financial transactions tax set 
at 10% of transactions costs would raise around £20bn if over-the-counter (OTC) transactions were 
excluded20. 
Including OTC transactions could net a total of £163bn, although this is largely because transaction 
costs for OTC transactions are so much higher (and so an effective tax rate of 0.076% is levied). This 
suggests that even if OTC transactions were taxed at a much lower rate – say 0.016% - there is still 
very significant revenue-raising potential (around £45-50bn in total). Efforts to reduce tax-avoiding 
behaviour have also spurred interest in some form of “digital tax”, although the likely revenue-
raising potential of such taxes is modest. 
                                                          
remove the need for such housing, we anticipate that the amount raised will tangentially approach our 
estimates as councils and housing associations move to charge market rents. This will remove the anomalous 
situation where the level of state support one is entitled to depends on seemingly random factors, including 
one’s support history and where one lives (not to mention the absurd situation where those working at 
minimum wage in poor regions are supporting market rents in a global megacity). 
19 Note that this is 25% of the price received by the seller of the product and not 25% of the price paid by the 
buyer. Since supply of property is extremely inelastic (ultimately being governed not by market forces but by 
the state via its control of planning regulations), the theoretical ramifications are obvious: the burden of 
taxation falls almost exclusively on the landlord who is forced to reduce her price by 20%. The revenue raised 
by government is therefore 20% of the total value of current imputed rents. 
20 This would be an effective tax rate of 0.004% and 0.002% for derivatives and forex transactions respectively. 
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Conclusion 
In total, therefore, we estimate the following additional tax incomes: 
 £113-123bn in additional income taxes 
 £12bn in additional Corporation Tax 
 £41bn in additional consumption taxes (VAT) 
 £50-100bn in new property taxes (net value, after eliminating Council Tax and Stamp Duty 
Land Tax) 
 Some £45-50bn from a financial transactions tax 
We also propose taxing unearned income at the same rate as earned income (effectively via 
eliminating employee Class 1 employee National Insurance and Class 4 National Insurance and 
replacing them with income tax. This would leave the tax paid by income earners unchanged, but 
would levy approximately an additional £12bn from unearned income (Her Majesty's Revenue and 
Customs, 2020c). However, this would be used to top up pensions such that every pensioner 
received a state pension of at least £8500. This would guarantee that no pensioner would be worse 
off than their working-age counterparts. Relatively few would be affected by this change (pension 
credit essentially guarantees a minimum income already), but it would predominantly act to benefit 
female pensioners without a full National Insurance record. 
This suggests net additional taxes of between £211bn and £326bn can be raised, although there is 
considerable uncertainty over these figures and how they might evolve over time. Even a 
conservative interpretation, however, suggests that the tax take would be sufficient to cover our 
proposed basic income, providing it is tapered. As such, although not a universal basic income, it is 
functionally identical to a UBI and higher marginal tax rates. Since the effective marginal taxes 
implied by this scheme are high (particularly for middle-income earners), we believe a more 
sustainable system involves using any additional revenues from property taxes, wealth taxes and 
VAT over time to reduce the basic rate of income tax. If our proposed taxes were to raise £250bn, 
this would give sufficient fiscal headroom to reduce income tax by 9p, which would go a substantial 
way to reducing the high effective marginal tax rates associated with a basic income. 
Finally, we note that current estimates of the cost of measures to tackle the economic impact of the 
spread of the novel coronavirus (SARS-CoV2) are very large. Much of this support could be sensibly 
replaced by a basic income, making the present a particularly apposite moment to introduce such a 
policy, temporarily financed via deficit spending. 
 
